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I. Introduction
The year 2003 illustrated the continuing tension between modem immigration law and
existing policies since September 11, 2001. Statutory, regulatory, and case law developments
alternate between advances that suggest the law will evolve along a rational developmental
path, and initiatives that imply that immigration will continue to be shaped by the security
concerns spawned by the September 11 terrorist attacks on the United States.
The duality of this approach was most apparent in attempts to create legislation. Although
no major legislation passed during the year, several legislative initiatives of great magnitude
were put forward. Some of these were ameliorative, and addressed long-standing immigra-
tion and social concerns. For example, the Development, Relief, and Education for Alien
Minors (DREAM) Act, offers the prospect of lawful permanent residence to many undoc-
umented students in the United States, helping to replenish the nation's diminishing human
capital.' Similarly, the proposed Agricultural Job Opportunity, Benefits, and Security Act
of 2003 (AgJOBS)2 establishes a mechanism by which agricultural workers may acquire
permanent status in the U.S., providing social protection to an historically vulnerable class.
The year 2003 also saw the appearance of highly restrictive measures. Among these was
the Domestic Security Enhancement Act of 2003 (PATRIOT Act 11), an initiative never
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1. Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors (DREAM) Act of 2003, S. 1545, 108th Cong.
(2003).
2. Agricultural Job Opportunity Benefits and Security Act of 2003 (AgJOBS), S. 1645, 108th Cong. (2003).
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introduced but widely discussed. The PATRIOT Act II would expand upon the Uniting
and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and
Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act by continuing the policy of secret mass deten-
tions. The Clear Law Enforcement for Criminal Alien Removal Act of 2003 (CLEAR Act)3,
which would engage state officials in the enforcement of federal immigration statutes, was
also introduced in 2003. Minor legislation regarding employment-based non-immigrant
visas was also proposed, but had not been acted on at year's end. In addition, the religious
worker provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act pertaining to immigrant visas
were extended five years.4
Also characterizing the year was growing criticism of the USA PATRIOT Act and the
Attorney General's practice of mass detentions. To critics, the detentions reflect a policy of
discrimination aimed at confessional Muslims. Chief among these criticisms was a Report
of the Inspector General setting forth specific excesses under the detention program. In
addition, many municipalities issued resolutions forbidding their employees from violating
state and federal constitutional provisions in their enforcement of the PATRIOT Act. Also
widely disparaged was the Attorney General's National Security Entry-Exit Registration
System (NSEERS) program, which would have required port of entry and internal regis-
tration of foreign nationals from specified states. By the end of the year, the government
announced a retreat from the NSEERS program.
In place of NSEERS, the United States has begun formulating the United States Visitor
and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT) program, which was announced
by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Secretary Tom Ridge in April 2003.6 US-
VISIT entails the collection of vital information, including biographic details and data
concerning criminal, immigration, and security-related matters, of non-citizens seeking
admission to the United States. Correspondingly, the Department of State has adopted
regulations which substantially restrict the conditions upon which non-immigrants may
have a personal consular interview waived prior to admission to the United States. The new
regulations are expected to engender substantial delays. New regulations were also adopted
in 2003 to clarify the distribution of responsibilities among the federal agencies charged
under the Homeland Security Act with administering U.S. immigration laws.
The Supreme Court's decision in Demore v. !K'm7 dominated the area of case law devel-
opment. Demore marks an apparent retreat from the protections mapped out in Zadvydas
v. Davis,8 in which the Court looked to constitutional controls to place limits on the plenary
power doctrine, establishing a time period in which otherwise deportable non-citizens must
be released if they cannot be removed. The Court declined to extend Zadvydas to the area
of criminal non-citizens who must be statutorily detained while their removal cases are
3. Clear Law Enforcement for Criminal Alien Removal Act of 2003 (CLEAR Act), H.R.2671,108th Cong.
(1st Sess. 2003).
4. Religious Worker Immigration Program Extension, 108 Pub. L. No. 108-99, 117 Stat. 1176 (Oct. 15,
2003).
5. U.S. Department ofJustice, Office of the Inspector General, The September 11 Detainees: A Review of the
Treatment of Aliens Held on Immigration Charges in Connection with the Investigation of the September 11
Attacks (June 2003), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/0306/index.htn(last visited May 20, 2004).
6. Press Release, Department of Homeland Security Announces Funding for States and Localities (Apr. 30,
2003), available at http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?content= 586.
7. Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003).
8. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001).
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pending. In other developments, the Court declined to review a ruling of the Third Circuit
upholding the constitutionality of secret removal proceedings; agreed to review whether
the writ of habeas corpus extends to foreign nationals detained at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba
as "unlawful combatants;" and upheld a determination of the Eleventh Circuit denying a
stay of removal so that a petition for review could be heard.
The Second Circuit ruled that the President did not have the independent power to
detain a U.S. citizen as an "enemy combatant." Merely hours later, the Ninth Circuit
concluded that federal courts have habeas jurisdiction to review issues arising out of the
detention of non-citizens at the Guantanamo Naval Base in Cuba. The Supreme Court is
likely to resolve the questions presented in the two cases.
Lower courts also made important pronouncements in the areas of collateral immigration
consequences of a criminal conviction and federal review of applications for lasting immi-
gration relief, which contain a discretionary element. The year included several adminis-
trative decisions of note, including a significant determination by the Board of Immigration
Appeals (BIA or Board) that victims of coercive family planning programs could still benefit
from the presumption of future persecution even though they had suffered a non-repeatable
form of harm.
Delays continued to plague administration of the refugee program, resulting in final
admission numbers that remain below authorized limits. The adjustment of status for asy-
lees continued to experience lengthy delays. In addition, a class action against the Attorney
General alleging mismanagement of asylum visa numbers remained pending. Nevertheless,
the Temporary Protected Status (TPS) program remained active with the Bureau of Citi-
zenship and Immigration Services (CIS) extending TPS status for several countries.
H. Legislative Developments
Although 2003 was not a year of significant statutory enactments, there were substantial
legislative initiatives during the period. For the most part, the nature of these initiatives
mirrored the divisions in immigration law and policy that have predominated since the
September 11 attacks.
A. THE PATRIOT ACT II
In the early part of the year, information leaked concerning draft legislation which would
further expand the already-controversial broad powers of the government to control ter-
rorism under the USA PATRIOT Act.9 The PATRIOT Act II, which was never introduced
as proposed legislation contains provisions which raise substantial due process concerns
about the rights of non-citizens. The draft measure would prohibit the release of the names
of individuals detained during a terrorism investigation. 0 Since this would include those
confined for minor immigration violations, the provision seeks to codify the practice of
keeping secret the names of non-citizens arrested solely because of their lack of immigration
status. In another area already engulfed in controversy, the PATRIOT II Act would open
the immigration files of non-citizens to local police immigration law enforcement." The
9. Patriot Act 1-Draft Legislation, available at http://www.thenewamerican.com/focus/patiotact/
patriotact2.pdf (last visited May 20, 2004).
10. Id. § 201.
11. Id. § 311.
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draft legislation also provides for the expatriation of citizens who supply "material support,"
which includes the giving of donations to terrorist organizations. 2
The legislation adds criminal penalties for minor immigration infractions, such as failure
to carry an alien registration card or to report a change of address." The Attorney General
is authorized to summarily remove any non-citizen the Attorney General has "reason to
believe" constitutes a security threat to the United States. 14 The "reason to believe" stan-
dard, based on an untested assessment by the Attorney General, parallels a pre-existing
procedure under the USA PATRIOT Act for the detention of suspected terrorists." The
PATRIOT Act II would, for the first time, subject lawful permanent residents to expedited
removal, thus excluding them from the protections of quasi-judicial proceedings before an
immigration judge and from judicial review of the removal process." Other provisions
would reduce the time to depart after the entry of a removal order 16 and authorize removal
to non-recognized countries. 7 At year's end, the proposed measure seemed to enjoy little
support among legislators.
B. THE CLEAR ACT
In the middle of the year, Representative Charles Norwood (R-GA) and others intro-
duced a bill in the House of Representatives known as the CLEAR Act.'" By using the
carrot and stick approach, the CLEAR Act seeks to accomplish through more discrete
means many of the provisions contemplated by PATRIOT Act II. The CLEAR Act re-
poses in State and local authorities the power to "investigate, apprehend, detain or remove
aliens in the United States (including the transportation of such aliens across State lines
to detention centers)."'" The CLEAR Act would require states and municipalities to
provide background information about apprehended undocumented aliens to the De-
partment of Homeland Security within ten days under the threat of ineligibility for future
federal funding for failure to implement appropriate enforcement policies z Correspond-
ing draft legislation would require the withdrawal of federal fimding to states that fail to
implement statutes authorizing the enforcement of immigration laws within two years
after enactment.2'
At the same time, the CLEAR Act provides substantial economic incentives for those
States and localities which adopt enforcement measures, including participation in collected
civil penalties and forfeitures" and compensation for the costs of incarcerating non-
citizens.23 The CLEAR Act also requires the Attorney General or the DHS to develop a
training program in which state and local officials can learn about immigration enforcement
12. Id. § 501.
13. Id. § 502.
14. Id. § 503.
15. Id. § 504.
16. Id. § 505.
17. Id. § 506.
18. CLEAR Act, H.R.2671, 108th Cong. (1st Sess. 2003).
19. Id. § 101.
20. Id. § 105.
21. Id. § 102.
22. Id. § 103(o.
23. Id. § 107.
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techniques.2 4 It also confers certain immunities upon state and local agencies arising from
enforcement activities.25 Similar to the disclosure of the PATRIOT Act II, the proposal of
the CLEAR Act stimulated harsh criticism over the Act's effect of reposing federal functions
in state and local officials who were not equipped to execute them. Critics also voiced
concern over the negative public policy implications of discouraging undocumented aliens
from seeking needed redress in criminal and humanitarian matters.
C. THE DREAM ACT
Contrasting with the above measures, which clearly have their provenance in the Sep-
tember 11 attacks, were the late summer proposals of the DREAM Act by Senators Orin
Hatch (R-UT) and Richard Durban (D-IL) in the Senate,2 6 and the Student Adjustment
Act by Rep. Chris Cannon (R-UT) and fifteen co-sponsors in the House. 7 Taken together,
these two bills would confer relief to undocumented non-citizens studying at United States
educational institutions.
For instance, DREAM, provides that certain students who have not yet turned sixteen
may apply for conditional permanent residence if they can show five years of continuous
physical presence in the United States prior to the date of enactment and "good moral
character" running from the date of application." In addition, the applicant must not be
inadmissible or deportable on criminal, security, or other grounds, and must not be subject
to a final order of removal.2 9 Qualifying students are those who have graduated from a U.S.
high school, been accepted to college in the United States, or obtained a general equivalency
diploma.30 Conditional residence would be conferred for a six year period, after which a
qualifying applicant could be granted permanent residence upon satisfying any one of the
following conditions: graduation from a two-year or vocational college; service of at least
two years in the U.S. armed forces; or performance of 910 hours of community service."t
Essentially, the DREAM Act would eliminate the restrictions established in § 505 of the
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) 2 which state that
individuals must be in lawful immigration status to qualify for post-secondary educational
benefits based on state residency. 3 DREAM would allow states to extend to non-citizens
the same sharply reduced tuitions that currently exist for state residents, thus easing foreign
nationals' access to U.S. educational opportunities.
The DREAM Act has attracted much support over the year. By October 2003, the bill
had been passed by the Senate Judiciary Committee, but only after incorporation into a
very damaging amendment sponsored by Senators Dianne Feinstein (D-CA) and Charles
Grassley (R-IO). The amendment would render otherwise qualifying students ineligible for
federal financial grants, such as Pell Grants. 34 Notwithstanding this development, the pro-
24. Id. § 109(c).
25. Id. § 110.
26. S. 1545, 108th Cong., 1st Sess.
27. H.R. 1684, 108th Cong., 1st Sess.
28. S. 1545 § 4(a).
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. § 4(c).
32. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IRIRA), Pub L. No. 104-208,
110 Stat. 3009-587 (Sept. 30, 1996).
33. Id. § 3.
34. Congress Web, Pass the DRFAMAct and StudentAdjustmentAct, at http://www.congressweb.com/cweb4/
index.cfm?orgcode =ACCT&issue = 7&showheaderfooter= no (last visited May 20, 2004).
SUMMER 2004
420 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
posed legislation has been generally praised as expanding the United States' supply of
needed human capital and as providing those who have benefited from U.S. educational
institutions the right to make a contribution."
D. AGJOBS
Another significant development was the introduction in both the Senate and the House
of AgJOBS. On September 23, 2003, Senators Edward M. Kennedy (D-MA) and Larry
Craig (R-ID) introduced S. 1645 in the Senate,36 while a similar bill was introduced in the
House by Representative Howard L. Berman (D-CA) and Chris Cannon (R-UT).17 Nu-
merous co-sponsors have agreed to support the measure. Under the Senate bill, agricultural
workers would be eligible for temporary residence in the United States if they could show
that they had worked for at least 575 hours or 100 days (whichever is less) during any twelve
consecutive months within an eighteen-month period ending August 31, 2003.38 The ap-
plicant must establish eligibility by a preponderance of the evidence, which may consist of
the employer's records or the production of sufficient evidence to demonstrate that eligi-
bility standards have been met. Application may be made with the Secretary, with a qualified
designated entity, or, outside the United States, at an appropriate consular office. Those
qualifying for temporary residence are given travel rights and employment authorization.
The temporary resident may not be fired so long as he was in status. Status does not come
to an end unless the temporary resident engages in activity that renders him deportable.
Temporary residents can then adjust their status to that of lawful permanent residence.
The applicant must show that he/she has performed 2,060 hours or 360 work days (which-
ever is less) of agricultural labor during the period beginning September 1, 2003, and ending
August 31, 2009.19 Two-thirds of the required 360 days or 2,060 hours must be completed
during the first two years." Application must be made by August 31, 2010.4 1 Spouses and
those who were minor children at the time the agricultural worker was granted temporary
residence are included in the application and may thus be granted permanent residence
along with the principal applicant. The applicant must be admissible, but waivers may be
secured for most grounds based on public interest, family unity, and humanitarian concerns. 42
The bill has been heralded by immigration advocates as constituting an extraordinary ad-
vance, whereby a group which has long suffered from exploitation at the hands of employers
can be protected by U.S. labor policy and access much needed social protection.
35. U.S. Visa News, DREAM Act of 2003 Moves to Senate With Amended Provisions, available at: http://
www.usvisanews.com/memo2168.html (last visited May 20, 2004).
36. S. 1645, 108th Cong., 1st Sess.
37. H.R. 3142, 108th Cong., 1st Sess.
38. S. 1645, § 101(a)(1)(A).
39. Id. § 101(c)(l)(A)(i).
40. Id. § 101(c)(1)(A)(ii).
41. Id. § 101(c)(1)(A)(iv).
42. Id. § 101(e)(2). The proposed legislation also contains provisions relating to reforming the H-2A
program for non-immigrants. Among other things, the bill would strengthen U.S. labor standards by re-
quiring that H-2A workers: (1) be reimbursed for certain types of transportation expenses; (2) receive either
housing or a housing allowance at no cost to the worker; and (3) be paid either the prevailing wage or the
wage paid to other U.S. workers similarly situated. Id. § 201, amending the INA §§ 218A(b)(1)(2)-(3),
8 USC §§ 118A(b)(1)-(3). Waivers for inadmissibility based on criminal, public charge, prior drug offenses,
and security-related grounds are not available.
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E. EMPLOYMENT-BASED IMMIGRATION
Significant activity also took place in the field of employment-based immigration law
although the impending difficulties now posed by the annual 65,000 cap on H-1B non-
immigrant visas remain unresolved The H-1B classification applies to those non-
immigrants coming to the United States to perform a Specialty Occupation.41 The H-lB
category remains the principal non-immigrant classification for U.S. employers seeking to
access the international labor market to satisfy vital staffing needs.
In 1990, Congress placed, for the first time, numerical restrictions on the number of
H-1B visas that could be issued annually. The 1990 cap was set at 65,000 visas. Subsequent
legislation in 1998 raised the cap for fiscal years 1999 and 2001. In 2000, Congress acted again
to raise the cap to 195,000 for the fiscal years 2001 through 2003. The 65,000 cap is to be
reinstated for fiscal year 2004. Not counted against the cap are petitions for Specialty Oc-
cupation non-immigrants who are currently present in the United States in H-1B status.
Certain occupations also are exempted specifically by legislation passed in 2000; these, in-
clude those coming to work at institutions of higher education and non-profit research or-
ganizations. 44
Although present statistics are inaccurate due to backlogs, they indicate that the current
195,000 H-lB cap was not reached in fiscal year 2003. This situation was clearly modified,
in February 2004 when the USCIS announced that the agency had "received enough
H-1B petitions to meet" the 65,000 cap for fiscal year 2004.41 Influencing such change has
undoubtedly been the adoption of the Chile and Singapore Free Trade Accords. These new
agreements, implemented by the United States-Chile Free Trade Implementation Act" and
the United States-Singapore Free Trade Implementation Act, 47 contain provisions that have
a significant effect on numerous non-immigrant classes, including business visitors, intra-
company transferees, treaty traders and investors, and H-lB's. With respect to non-
immigrant admissions, the agreements mirror earlier free trade accords, with the following
special restrictions applying to the Specialty Occupation class: (1) annual limits of 5,400 in
Singapore and 1,400 in Chile, with admissions to count against the 65,000 annual cap now
applicable in 2004; (2) the requirement that a labor condition application be approved prior
to admission and that it indicates that the Specialty Occupation non-immigrant will be paid
either the prevailing wage or the actual wage, whichever is higher; (3) an initial period of
admission of one year with additional incremental periods of stay indefinitely thereafter; and
(4) non-recognition of the doctrine of dual intent. Dual intent is otherwise applicable to the
H- 1B class, as well as to other non-immigrant categories, and allows, under stated conditions,
a non-immigrant period of stay to be extended despite the fact that an immigrant visa petition
remains pending. 4s
43. Generally those having a profession as manifested by a U.S. baccalaureate degree or its equivalent, and
whose professional skills are needed to perform the proposed employment here. 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq. INA
§ 101(a)(15)(H)(1)(b).
44. For background information, see Austin T. Fragomen and Steven G. Bell, Immigration Fundamentals
§ 5.10.1 (2003).
45. U.S. Citizenship and Inmigration Services, Press Release, USCIS Announces New H-lB Procedures-
Reaches Cap (Rev. 2/19/04) (Feb. 17, 2004), available at http://www/uscis.gov.
46. See United States-Chile Free Trade Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 108-78, 117 Stat. 948 (2003).
47. See United States-Singapore Free Trade Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 108-77, 117 Stat. 909 (2003).
48. For a discussion of the H-lB cap and the manner in which it may be impacted by the Singapore and
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During 2003, several bills were introduced which would both place substantial restric-
tions on the use of the L- I non-immigrant classification and directly affect the H-I B class.
Congress enacted the L-1 category in 1970 to facilitate the admission of managers, exec-
utives and those having specialized knowledge who are being transferred by a multinational
concern maintaining a business presence in the United States.49 At the end of the year,
however, a far more limited Senate bill was introduced-the L-1 Visa (IntracompanyTrans-
feree) Reform Act of 2003.50 The Act would render ineligible for L-l classification non-
citizens seeking admission on the basis of "specialized knowledge" where the alien will be
stationed at a work site different from that of the petitioner if either of the following
conditions are present: (1) the alien will be supervised by an employer other than the
petitioner; or (2) placement of the alien is part of an arrangement to provide a product or
service for which "specialized knowledge" specific to the petitioner is not required."'
Finally, on October 15, 2003, in a measure which was widely expected, President Bush
signed into law an extension of the religious immigrant worker program for another five
years.5 2 Although the law has been routinely extended since its initial adoption in the Im-
migration Act of 1990, this is the first time that the program has been extended for five
years instead of the customary two-year period.
I. Administrative and Regulatory Developments
A. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
1. Enforcement Measures
Among the principal developments of 2003 was municipal governments' sustained resis-
tance to enforcement of the USA PATRIOT Act adopted by the Congress in 2001 in the
Chile Free Trade Accords, see generally Austin T. Fragomen and Howard W. Gordon, Legislative and Admin-
istrative Update, 36th Annual Immigration & Naturalization Institute 11, 18-20 (2003).
49. For instance, on July 25, 2003, Senator Christopher Dodd (D-CT) and Representative NancyJohnson
(R-CT) introduced companion legislation in the Senate (S. 1452) and the House (H.R. 2849) which would
subject all L-1 non-immigrants to the labor attestation and prevailing wage requirements which presently apply
only to those seeking admission in the H-lB category. The bill also contained the following substantive re-
strictions: (1) a prohibition on outplacement where there were indications of employment with the second
employer; (2) a reduction in the period of stay to 5 years in the case of intra-company managers and directors
(L-IA's) and to 2 years in the case of those having specialized knowledge (L-1B's); (3) a requirement that the
L-1 have two years of experience rather than one, as is the case under current law; (4) restrictions on the use
of blanket petitions; (5) a showing that the petitioner is attempting to recruit U.S. workers; and (6) provisions
restricting the layoffs of U.S. workers similar to those proposed for Specialty Occupation non-immigrants.
This legislative initiative, insofar as it affects the L-1 class, would appear to go well beyond apprehensions
regarding abuses in the outplacement context. Rather, it reflects a continuing concern relative to eliminating
the L-1 class from U.S. labor policy and illustrate the need to subject multinational corporations to U.S. labor
standards. The proposed legislation would also apply fresh restrictions on the H-1B category. Presently,
H-1B employers are subject to numerous restrictions only if they are "H-lB dependent employers" (signifying
generally that greater than 15 percent of the employer's work force is comprised of H-1B workers). These
restrictions include a labor attestation requirement to the effect that the employer is continuing to recruit U.S.
workers to fill the position covered by the petition and that there has been no displacement of U.S. workers
for 90 days immediately preceding placement of the H-1B non-immigrant and for ninety days thereafter. The
proposed legislation would extend this period to 180 days before and after placement.
50. L-1 Visa (Intracompany Transferee) Reform Act of 2003, S. 1635, 108th Cong. (1st Sess. 2003).
51. Id. § 3(a).
52. H.R. 2152, Pub. L. No. 108-99, 117 Stat. 1176 (Oct. 15, 2003).
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wake of the September 11 attacks. Among other things, the USA PATRIOT Act sought to
involve state and local governments in immigration enforcement, an area where they had
little or no experience. In the wake of highly unprecedented restrictions contained in the
USA PATRIOT Act, approximately twenty municipal governments have undertaken
counter-measures, such as the resolution adopted by the City of Oakland (California) in
December 2003 ordering its employees not to cooperate with federal investigations which
are believed to violate the Bill of Rights." While maintaining a staunch resolve to fight
terrorism by any legitimate means, such local initiatives have been based on the premise
that weeding out terrorism should not be accomplished at the expense of fundamental
human rights and liberties.
Reaction by local governments was accompanied at the federal level by a Report of the
Inspector General issued under the USA PATRIOT Act substantially criticizing the deten-
tion policies of the Department ofJustice1 4 The report concluded that the Federal Bureau
of Investigation (FBI) failed to distinguish between aliens who were legitimately suspected
of terrorism, and those who, at most, would have been culpable of relatively innocuous
immigration violations. Many aliens who had been detained did not receive a Notice to
Appear (the relevant charging document) within the normally required forty-eight hours,
and often had to wait a month to be apprised of the charges against them.
Many of those detained were confined under highly restrictive conditions, usually based
on the uninformed opinion of the FBI regarding the non-citizen's connection to terrorism.
Such restrictive conditions could consist of a "'lock-down' for at least 23 hours a day; escort
procedures that included a 'four-man hold' with handcuffs, leg irons, and heavy chains any
time the detainees were moved outside their cells; and a limit of one telephone call per
week and one social call per month."" As a result of these procedures, many detainees were
unable to communicate with counsel and thus gain legal representation. Moreover, the
family and friends of detainees often were wholly ignorant of where they were, while even
law enforcement officials were unable to determine their whereabouts. All of this was ac-
companied at some facilities by a pattern of continuing harassment, carried out by correc-
tional officials and by the prison population with which the 9/11 detainees were often
housed. The Inspector General's Report has obviously increased public anxieties regarding
the enforcement measures adopted by the government to fight terrorism and has assisted
in creating an environment of public resistance to the excesses fostered by those measures.16
In apparent acquiescence to the emerging mood, DHS announced, towards the end of
the year, a substantial dilution to its NSEERS program. Initially, NSEERS had been im-
plemented in 2002 in an effort to track and monitor certain non-immigrants throughout
their stay in the United States. Certain classes were exempt from registration, including
U.S. citizens, lawful permanent residents, asylum applicants, asylum grantees, and non-
immigrants in the A or G classes (relating for the most part to diplomats). NSEERS re-
quired registration at two critical junctures: (1) upon initial arrival in the United States;
and (2) re-registration on an annual basis if the non-citizen is within a group of citizens or
53. ABC News, War on Terrorism Walkouts: Oakland, Flagstaff City Councils to Vote on Opposition to Patriot
Act Provisions Dec. 17, 2002, available at http://abcnews.go.com/sections/us/DailyNews/usapatriotoakland
021217.html.




424 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
nationals of certain designated countries. To comply, many non-citizens residing in the
United States who entered as non-immigrants before the commencement of the program
were required to appear before the former Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)
and register under NSEERS. s7 For the most part, these foreign nationals were the citizens
of predominantly Islamic states located in the Near East. Again, the NSEERS program, as
implemented, has been perceived as seriously flawed and predicated on a policy of discrim-
ination toward confessional Muslims.
On December 1, 2003, DHS announced that it would suspend two principal elements
of the NSEERS program: (1) the annual re-registration requirement applicable to both
"call-in" registrants and those registering at a port-of-entry (POE); and (2) a thirty-forty
day follow up interview applicable only to POE registrants. 8 The DHS statement accom-
panying the announcement of the new policy reflects that NSEERS has largely been a
success, with more than 13,800 individuals with immigration violations referred to immi-
gration courts for expulsion proceedings, and "several individuals" with possible terrorist
links being entry.5 9
2. Processing Issues
The new system, which will eventually absorb NSEERS, is the US-VISIT program. US-
VISIT was announced by the Secretary of Homeland Security Tom Ridge on April 29,
2003, and further refined by Asa Hutchinson, Undersecretary for Border and Transporta-
tion Security on April 29, 2003.60 An integrated entry-exit system was mandated by the
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, with deadlines set by sub-
sequent legislation of December 31, 2003 for sea and air ports of entry and of December
31, 2004 for high-traffic land border ports of entry.61
Secretary Ridge describes US-VISIT as a "check-in/check-out" system. The system will
collect information concerning foreign nationals, including elements of his or her back-
ground which may render the non-citizen ineligible to enter the United States. Such in-
formation consists of details regarding whether the applicant has a criminal past, has pre-
viously violated her period of stay, has terrorist connections, or otherwise presents a national
security risk. Initial information gathering will take place at international sea or air ports
of entry at which the foreign national's passport will be scanned and her photograph and
fingerprints will be taken. Border officials will then collect data concerning the individual
applicant including basic biographic information, country of nationality, passport number,
alien registration number where applicable, and address in the United States. The infor-
mation will then be checked against various databases maintained by national security and
law enforcement agencies in the United States. The foreign national's identity will be re-
verified upon departure. The system is intended to track extensions and changes in the
applicant's period of stay. The information collected at POE's will be available to inspectors
57. This aspect of the program was designated "call-in" registration. Id.
58. 8 C.F.R. § 264.1 (2004).
59. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Fact Sheet: Changes to National Security Entny/Exit Registration
System (NSEERS) (Dec. 1, 2003), available at http://www.dhs.com.
60. U.S. Department. of Homeland Security, Press Release, Fact Sheet: U.S.-VSIT PROGRAM (May 19,
2003), reprinted in 8 Benders Immigration Bulletin 984-86 (June 1, 2003).
61. See generally Austin T. Fragomen and Howard W. Gordon, Legislative and Administrative Update, 36th
Annual Immigration and Naturalization Institute 11, 16-17 (2003).
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at the U.S. Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), other immigration
adjudication offices, law enforcement agencies, and U.S. consular offices.62
The Homeland Security Act mandates that all immigration-related function previously
undertaken by the former INS be discharged by the newly-created DHS.6 Formal transfer
of power from the INS to the DHS took place on March 1, 2003. During the year, major
modifications were made affecting the regulatory structure which administers the Immi-
gration and Nationality Act.
In the HSA, Congress divided the former INS's enforcement functions into two distinct
agencies within the DHS: one for service needs and the other for enforcement matters.
The HSA further empowered the President to amend the statutory allocation of functions.
The President, acting pursuant to this grant of authority, transformed two enforcement
agencies into three. At present, two agencies serve enforcement objectives, while a third
exists for service functions. The two enforcement agencies are the Bureau of Customs and
Border Protection (CBP), which is headed by a Commissioner; and the Bureau of Immi-
gration and Customs Enforcement which is headed by an Assistant Commissioner. Both
enforcement agencies operate under the Undersecretary of Border and Transportation Se-
curity, who is directly responsible to the Secretary of Homeland Security.64
The CBP assumed the responsibilities of the old INS Border Patrol as well as certain
border inspections that were had been executed by a number of agencies, including the INS
and the Customs Service. The border inspections are conducted at all POEs-land borders,
airports, and seaports. For matters within the United States, the ICE is chiefly responsible
for enforcing the Immigration and Nationality Act. ICE duties include conducting inves-
tigations, gathering intelligence, and registering non-citizens. The ICE will also assume
certain important litigation responsibilities, including representing the government's in-
terests in removal proceedings before the Executive Office of Immigration Review (EOIR).
The newly created Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services, which was renamed
the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS), assumes the "benefits" functions of
the old INS. For instance, the CIS is responsible for processing a variety of applications,
including immigration petitions and applications for adjustment of status. As opposed to
the new DHS agencies, the EOIR remains under the Department of Justice and has been
largely unaffected by the HSA. One important development under the HSA, however, is
the regulatory change adopted in February that makes decisions of the BIA binding on all
DHS officers as well as on immigration judges.61
B. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
In an important measure which will have a substantial effect on non-immigrant traffic to
the United States, the Department of State issued an interim rule which significantly in-
creases the number of non-immigrant applicants who must appear for a personal interview
before a non-immigrant visa will be granted. A May 21, 2003 cable instructed consulates
to implement the new restrictions as quickly as possible with full implementation to take
62. Id.
63. Homeland Security Act of 2002 § 471(a), Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Sta. 2135 (2002).
64. See Border Reorganization Fact Sheet (Jan. 20, 2003), cited in Steven Legomsky, Immigration and Refugee
Law and Policy 3 (2003 Supp.).
65. See 68 Fed. Reg. 9831-32 (Feb. 28, 2003), amending 8 CFR § 1003.1(g).
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place by no later than August 1, 2003. The State Department issued its interim rule on July
7, 2003.66 While the new policy provides for limited exceptions, such as visa re-issuance, it
is widely believed that most non-immigrants will be subject to the new procedures and that
substantial delays will be involved.
In the past, consular officials were authorized to waive personal interviews in a variety of
circumstances. Such instances have entailed applicants for admission who are visitors, spe-
cialty occupation non-immigrants, and certain exchange visitors. These classes will now be
subject, for the most part, to an interview requirement. Furthermore, the exception pre-
viously existing for persons under the age of fourteen was raised to sixteen. In general, only
the following categories of individuals will be exempt: (1) children under the age of 16;
(2) persons who are older than 60; (3) certain non-immigrants covered by the A and G
categories as well as those eligible for NATO visas, not including their servants and personal
attendants; (4) diplomats who are heads of state or senior foreign officials, including their
family members and support staffs; (5) applicants seeking visa re-issuance within twelve
months at the post of their usual residence; and (6) those who are determined to merit a
waiver in the national interests or by reason of unusual circumstances. 67
The Deputy Assistant Secretary for Visa Services may waive a personal interview for an
individual if the Deputy Secretary finds that certain criteria are met and that national se-
curity interests do not require an interview. Natural disasters, political turmoil, or other
developments with humanitarian implications which impede the foreign national's access
to the consulate are clearly contemplated in this exception.68 For instance, many French
nationals seeking non-immigrant visas were excused from the interview process in 2003
because of the summer's excessive heat wave, which caused an unprecedented number of
deaths.
The aforementioned exceptions are not compulsory, however, and the consulate may still
require an interview in the exercise of discretion. Moreover, even if an exception applies,
the following classes will be required to sit for an interview: (1) those who do not reside in
the consular district in which the application is being made; (2) those previously denied a
visa; (3) those requiring a security advisory opinion from the State Department; and
(4) those identified as members of a group considered to be a high fraud risk, to have a
high refusal rate, or to present national security concerns. 6
9
In August, the State Department, in conjunction with the DHS, announced the tem-
porary suspension of two widely-used programs: the Transit Without Official Visa
(TWOV) Program and the International to International (ITI) Program. These suspen-
sions were effective as of August 2, 2003.70 The TWOV Program allows passengers arriving
in the United States to land here, provided that they undergo immigration and customs
checks and are scheduled to leave on the same or a connecting plane within eight hours of
their arrival. The ITI Program allows foreign nationals on their way to an alternative
destination to "transit" in a U.S. airport. ITI passengers are subject to immigration in-
spection and, unlike TWOV passengers, must wait in a holding area pending the departure
of their scheduled flights. Included in the limited exceptions to the suspension are those in




70. 68 Fed. Reg. 46926 (Aug., 2003).
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flight at the time the policy went into effect and those who have already purchased their
tickets. The suspensions were adopted pursuant to intelligence received on possible terrorist
activity and will be reviewed on a sixty-day basis.7
IV. New Case Law Developments
A. SUPREME COURT DEcisIONS
The Supreme Court conveyed important signals concerning its stance on immigration
law and policy not only in its holdings but also in the cases that it chose to accept-or
reject-review. Its principal decision in Demore v. gKim 72 is considered a retreat from the
protections the Court had crafted in Zadvydas v. Davis.73 In Zadvydas, the Court held that
non-citizens could not be detained indefinitely where their removal had been frustrated by
external circumstances such as the absence of repatriation agreements with their home
state.
7 4
Alternatively, in Demore, the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit ruling and held
that mandatory pre-trial detention did not offend the Fifth Amendment's Due Process
Clause.75 The Court ruled that it would defer to the legislative presumption that aliens
convicted of certain types of crimes constituted flight risks. In making this determination,
the Court noted the Vera Institute's findings that about twenty-three percent of aliens
actually released from detention fail to appear for their immigration hearings.
76
The Court distinguished Zadvydas on two essential grounds. Zadvydas, the Court found,
concerned indefinite detention, whereas aliens detained under INA § 2 3 6(c) were confined
only for comparatively shorter periods of time.77 The Court's consideration of the rational
relationship between detention and removal in Demore illustrated the continuing influence
of Zadvydas. Alien detentions under INA § 236(c) pending their removal from the U.S.
were necessarily incident to that removal. No such rational relationship was made out in
Zadvydas where the Court concluded INA § 241 (a)(6), which provides an unspecified period
of detention, would apply irrespective of the likelihood of removal."M Hence, the required
showing that there be a rational relationship between removal and detention is one which
survives Demore.
The Court's decision to deny certiorari in the case of North Jersey Media Group v. Ashcroft
was also significant."9 The Third Circuit had held that closure of "special interest" removal
hearings involving respondents having alleged terrorist associations did not offend First
Amendment principles. 8° The case involved a government memorandum issued by Chief
71. Id.
72. Demore, 538 U.S. 510.
73. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. 678.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. 538 U.S. at 520.
77. The Court's assessment that individuals must wait a few months at most while their cases are winding
towards a conclusion was highly optimistic in light of current litigation realities. Indeed, between trial, admin-
istrative appeal and judicial review, the process may well take up to at least a year.
78. Demore, 538 U.S. at 526-533. (discussing Zadvydas).
79. North Jersey Media Group v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2002), cert denied, 538 U.S. 1056 (2003).
80. Id. A similar result was reached in Center for Nat.l Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 331 F.3d 918
(D.C. Cir. 2003). But see Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681 (6th Cir. 2002).
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Immigration Judge Michael Creppy, which essentially closed to the public certain types of
removal proceedings-namely those involving respondents that might have knowledge
of September 1 attacks."' The Third Circuit reconciled its holding with the rationale of
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia,s2 by distinguishing criminal trials from administrative
removal proceedings. The Third Circuit thus rejected the analogy between common law
criminal trials and administrative removal proceedings that had been upheld by the Sixth
Circuit.s"
After determining that there was no mandatory right of access, the court ruled that such
access could exist only through "administrative grace." In this respect, the Third Circuit
concluded that the interests protected by secrecy outweighed the interests advanced by
open proceedings."s An interesting dissent discussed the growth of the administrative state
and the dire consequences of allowing agencies to affect vital interests in an environment
governed by secrecy."s The Supreme Court's decision to deny certiorari, however, leaves
the regime set up by the Creppy memorandum intact.
In Kenyeres v. Ashcroft,"5 the Supreme Court denied a stay of removal to an asylum seeker
while his petition for review of his case was pending. In Kenyeres, a native and citizen of
Hungary had been denied asylum by an immigration judge on the grounds that the appli-
cation was not within the one-year filing deadline. In addition, the judge withheld removal
under § 8 U.S.C. 12 3 l(b)(3) (2003) because there was evidence that prior to coming to the
United States, the applicant had committed embezzlement, a serious non-political crime.
When the BIA denied his appeal, the asylum seeker sought review and a stay in the Eleventh
Circuit. That court denied the application for a stay under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(2), which
provides that "no court shall enjoin the removal of any alien pursuant to a final order under
this section unless the alien shows by clear and convincing evidence that the entry or exe-
cution of such order is prohibited as a matter of law."87
Petitioner had argued that the standard set forth in § 1252(f)(2) should apply to per-
manent injunctions against removal, not temporary stays such as the one sought here. The
Court's majority, however, in an opinion written by Justice Kennedy, was of an opposing
view. Section 1252(f)(2), the Court held, was part of Congress' deliberate effort to remove
federal courts from the need to consider petitions which were essentially without merit.
Despite apparent public policy misgivings,"8 Kennedy wrote that "a reviewing court must
uphold an administrative determination in an immigration case unless the evidence compels
a conclusion to the contrary." 9 There was evidence that the applicant had committed fi-
81. Id.
82. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
83. North Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d at 204-216.
84. Id. at 216-220.
85. Id. at 221-229.
86. Kenyeres v. Ashcroft, 538 U.S. 1301 (2003).
87. Id.
88. According to Court records, Kennedy clearly recognized the significance of the Court's decision. Hence-
forth, Kennedy wrote, asylum seekers seeking a stay of removal while their petitions are pending will be required
to show a great deal more than likely success on the merits, a standard arguably incompatible with the mores
of an asylum state which, unlike the persecuting state the non-citizen was fleeing, champions the rule of law.
See David Cleveland, Immigration Law and the U.S. Supreme Court: 2002 Has Been a Precedential Term, 22 IMMIGH.
LAw TODAY 12 (Sept.-Oct. 2003).
89. Kenyeres, 538 U.S. 1301.
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nancial crimes in the home state which precluded him from withholding of removal under
U.S. law.-
Another important development was the Supreme Court's granting of certiorari in Al
Odab v. United States.91 The case concerned the Military Order signed by President Bush
in 2001 ordering the establishment of military commissions to try certain individuals be-
lieved to be involved in terrorist acts against the United States.92 The Order relates to non-
citizens whom the President has reason to believe: (1) are present or former members of al
Qaeda; (2) are involved in activities with adverse effects on the United States, its citizens,
its national security, economy, or foreign policy; or (3) persons who may have harbored any
of the foregoing individuals. 93
Al Odab v. United States,94 involved two actions in which the petitioners, non-citizens
detained at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, pursuant to the Military Order, challenged the con-
ditions of their confinement. In one case, the petitioners sought more humanitarian treat-
ment, including access to their families. In the other case, petitioners sought actual release
from confinement. The District Court for the District of Columbia, 9 treating both cases
as involving petitions for writ of habeas corpus, ruled that it lacked jurisdiction to hear such
petitions, as petitioners were non-citizens seeking relief from outside the jurisdictional con-
fines of the United States. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed this
ruling with minor modification. Relying on the authority of Johnson v. Eisentrager9 6 the
court found that Fifth Amendment rights do not extend to aliens who are outside the
sovereign territory of the United States.
The Al Odab case and others like it raise substantial issues with respect to whether:
(1) the President has the constitutional authority to establish military tribunals which do
not conform with the applicable rules of the Uniform Code of Military Justice and the
Third Geneva Convention III Relative to Prisoners of War; and (2) such tribunals are
compatible with general international law. Unless the Court upholds habeas jurisdiction to
review the situation in Guantanamo, these questions will not receive judicial treatment.
B. LOWER COURT AND ADMINISTRATIVE CASES
1. Lower Court Cases
The year also saw significant developments in the areas of federal and administrative case
law. While many of these developments occurred at the Board level, there were also some
lower court decisions of note.
In Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 97 the Second Circuit held that the President did not have inde-
pendent authority, absent a specific grant of power from Congress, to detain a U.S. citizen
90. Id.
91. The Supreme Court's grant of certiorari is limited to the following question: "Whether United States
courts lack jurisdiction to consider challenges to the legality of detention of foreign nationals captured abroad
in connection with hostilities and incarcerated at the Guantanamo Naval Base, Cuba." See Al Odah v. United
States, 321 F.3d 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2003); see also Linda Greenhouse, Justices to Hear Case of Detainees at Guan-
tanamo, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 2003.
92. Detention, Treatment and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg.
57833 (Nov. 13, 2001).
93. Id.
94. AlOdab, 321 F.3d 1134.
95. Rasul v. Bush, 215 F. Supp. 2d 55, *73 (D.D.C. 2002).
96. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
97. Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695 (2d Cir. 2003).
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as an "unlawful combatant." The Court determined that the Quirin0 case, a 1942 decision
putatively authorizing the possible detention of U.S. citizens as enemy combatants pursuant
to the war power, was not controlling in light of subsequent legislation specifically prohib-
iting the detention of U.S. citizens absent congressional authorization." In Gherebi v. Rums-
feld, °° the Ninth Circuit held that detainees at the Guantanamo Naval Base could have
access to the U.S. justice system to challenge the conditions of their confinement there.
Gherebi had challenged the President's asserted exclusive competence to hold foreign na-
tionals indefinitely without trial as a violation of the U.S. Constitution and of the Third
Geneva Convention Relative to Prisoners of War. In upholding habeas jurisdiction in this
instance, the Ninth Circuit effectively ruled that those on Guantanamo must have access
to counsel and recourse of judicial review.
Several decisions of note came down during the year regarding the Convention Against
Torture. In Wang v. Ashcroft,'0' the Second Circuit held that federal courts retain jurisdiction
under the general habeas corpus statute and that petitioner's claim under the Convention
Against Torture, which challenged the application by the Board of particular facts to his
case, fell within the permissible scope of review. 02 However, the appeals court also ruled
that petitioner had failed to show that it was more likely than not that his desertion from
the Chinese military would lead to his being tortured upon return to the People's Republic
of China.103 In Ogbudimkpa v. INS,' °4 the Third Circuit held that habeas jurisdiction would
lie where petitioner sought review of the Board's denial of his motion to reopen his case
alleging that his removal to Nigeria would violate the Convention Against Torture. 0 5 The
appeals court held that habeas jurisdiction was not precluded by the Foreign Affairs Reform
and Restructuring Act of 1998.106
Several other significant decisions also were made involving immigration consequences
of a criminal conviction. In Cedano-Viera v. Ashcroft, 1 1 the Ninth Circuit ruled that a state
offense of lewdness with a child under fourteen years of age constitutes "sexual abuse of a
minor" and is therefore an "aggravated felony" within the meaning of INA § 101(a)(43).10 8
The appeals court determined that: (1) it had jurisdiction only to review whether petitioner
was removable under INA § 101(a)(43); and (2) it was thus precluded from reviewing the
removal order per se. 109 The court found that the term "sexual abuse of a minor" was not
ambiguous in light of the "ordinary, contemporary and common meaning" of the term' 10
The Ninth Circuit followed a similar approach in Nevarez-Martinez v. INS,"' where the
court limited its review to determining whether a "theft offense" under state law fell within
98. Erparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
99. 353 F.3d at 715.
100. Gherebi v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 1278 (9th Cir. 2003).
101. Wang v. Ashcroft, 320 F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 2003).
102. Id. at 141-142.
103. Id. at 144.
104. Ogbudimkpa v. INS, 342 F.3d 207 (3d Cir. 2003).
105. Id. at 222.
106. Id.
107. Cedano-Viera v. Ashcroft, 324 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2003).
108. Id. at 1067.
109. Id. at 1070.
110. Id. at 1066.
111. 326 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 2003).
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INA § 101 (a)(43), but achieved a different result. Here, the court found that the state statute
was divisible, and that, since some sections of the law did not require the elements of an
"aggravated felony", the non-citizen had not been convicted of one." 2
A similar result was reached in the Second Circuit in Jobson v. Ashcroft."' There, the
court determined that a New York State conviction for "second degree manslaughter" did
not satisfy the criteria of a "crime of violence" so as to be an "aggravated felony," because
the statute did not require, under a minimum reading, a "substantial risk of the use of
physical force against the person or property of another." 14 Instead, a conviction under the
statute could rest on reckless conduct standing alone. In a companion case, Cbrzanoski v.
Ashcroft,"' the Second Circuit ruled that third degree assault under Connecticut law did
not amount to a crime of violence so as to render the respondent deportable under INA
§ 237(a)(2)(A)(iii)." i6 In Chrzanoski, the Second Circuit found that the state statute did not
require the "use of force" for a conviction to be sustained.'
These cases illustrate the very limited review which federal courts will give to cases where
lawful permanent residents are ordered removed based on an aggravated felony conviction,
despite the dramatic consequences such removal normally entails. The decisions also illus-
trate, however, that the categorical analysis will be applied with great vigor by reviewing
courts, forcing the government to meet its burden of showing deportability by clear and
convincing evidence.
Two important pronouncements came down during the year as to what evidence could
be examined to determine whether a respondent is deportable under the categorical analysis.
The established doctrine is that an immigration judge may look to the "record of convic-
tion," including the judgment of conviction, the accusatory instrument, the plea, and the
sentencing minutes, to determine whether the alien stands convicted, for instance, of a
crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT). In Hernandez-Martinez v. Asbcroft,"8 the Ninth
Circuit held that the pre-sentence report was not sufficient evidence to establish that the
petitioner's conviction for aggravated driving under the influence was a CIMT so as to
render petitioner deportable. 19 In Dickson v. Ashcroft, 20 the Second Circuit reached a similar
result, holding that a narrative contained in the pre-sentence was unreliable and therefore
could not be consulted in determining whether conviction under a divisible statute relating
to first degree unlawful imprisonment was for a "crime of violence" so as to constitute an
aggravated felony.-
In United States v. Fry22 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a denial of habeas
relief based on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at the time of petitioner's criminal
trial. Petitioner argued that his counsel had been ineffective by failing to advise him that
he would render himself deportable by pleading guilty to participating in a fraudulent
112. Id. at 1055.
113. Jobson v. Ashcroft, 326 F.3d 367 (2d Cir. 2003).
114. Id. at 371-376.
115. Chrzanoski v. Ashcroft, 327 F.3d 188 (2d Cir. 2003).
116. Id. at 196.
117. Id.
118. Hernandez-Martinezv. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 1117 (9th Cir. 2003).
119. Id. at 1119.
120. Dickson v. Ashcroft, 346 F.3d 44 (2d Cir. 2003).
121. Id.
122. United States v. Fry, 322 F.3d 1198 (9th Cir. 2003).
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telemarketing scheme. The Ninth Circuit, adopting an "objective standard of reasonable-
ness," as the appropriate test held that deportation is a collateral rather than direct conse-
quence of a criminal conviction. Accordingly, failure to advise a defendant of the immigra-
tion consequences of a plea does not violate the Sixth Amendment guarantee of effective
assistance of counsel. The case is noteworthy only in that it conforms to jurisprudence in
other circuits and represents the emergence of a harsh rule that criminal counsel is not
under an absolute duty to advise a client that pleading guilty to a criminal charge may well
render him or her deportable and without a remedy.
Concerning applications for lasting immigration relief filed by non-permanent residents,
the Eleventh and Ninth Circuits issued decisions in Gonzalez-Oropeza v. Attorney-General'2 3
and Romero-Torres v. Ashcroft, 12 4 respectively, which cast doubt on non-citizens' ability to
achieve effective review of denial of their Cancellation of Removal, Part B, claims. Both
courts ruled that a determination at the administrative level regarding whether the applicant
had met the statutory standard by showing extremely unusual and exceptional hardship to
a lawful permanent resident or U.S. citizen spouse, parent or child was a "subjective, dis-
cretionary judgment" which is not subject to federal review.125 Although the discretionary
elements of INA § 240A(b) are clearly exempt from federal review, the hardship standard
appears to entail a legal determination that is not exempt. On the other hand, in Ali v.
Ashcroft, 1 26 the Ninth Circuit affirmed a district court decision barring petitioners' removal
to Somalia in light of the fact that Somalia did not have a functioning government that
could accept them. The court held that exhaustion of administrative remedies did not apply
for habeas jurisdiction in this case, and that review was unaffected by INA § 2 42 (g), which
precludes jurisdiction over the government's discretionary determination to enforce re-
moval orders. 127 Resolution of the underlying legal issue of Somalia's ability to accept the
petitioners preempted both recourse to further proceedings and the government's exercise
of discretion.
2. Administrative Cases
The Board also made some significant pronouncements during the year in the areas of
asylum, detention, and the immigration consequences of a criminal conviction.
In Matter of Y-T-L-,' 28 the claimant showed that his spouse had been sterilized in the
People's Republic of China (PRC) and thus was a victim of the PRC's coercive planning
family program. The Board ruled that the fact that the claimant and his spouse faced no
further threat of sterilization or abortion did not constitute a "fundamental change" in
circumstances which could be used to overcome the presumption of future persecution
flowing from such past serious harm under 8 CFR § 1208.13(b)(l)(i)(A). 2 9 The case thus
puts to rest arguments heretofore advanced by the government that acts of serious bodily
mutilation, which cannot be repeated, do not give rise to the presumption of future per-
secution. The Board in a sweeping decision determined: (1) that depriving the asylum seeker
123. Gonzalez-Opopeza v. Att'y Gen., 321 F.3d 1331 (11th Cir. 2003).
124. Romero-Torres v. Ashcroft, 327 F.3d 887 (9th Cir. 2003).
125. INA § 240A(b).
126. Ali Ali v. Ashcroft, 346 F.3d 873 (9th Cir. 2003).
127. Id.
128. In re Y-T-L-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 601 (B.I.A. 2003).
129. Id.
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or the asylum seeker's spouse, of the ability to procreate is a human rights violation which
is permanent and does not come to an end when the act of sterilization is completed; and
(2) that an alternative reading of the refugee definition in INA §101(a)(42) would tend to
make the act of persecution itself a change in circumstances, an anomalous result which is
unacceptable from a public policy perspective. 130
In Matter ofR-S-H-,"' the Board affirmed an immigration judge's conclusion thata native
and citizen of Lebanon, who had been a co-founder, treasurer, and board member of the
Global Relief Fund (GRF), was ineligible for asylum since he constituted a national security
threat. GRF, the Board found, was an organization classified as a Specially Designated
Terrorist Organization by the Department of State. The Board upheld the immigration
judge's findings that a plethora of public information linked the GFR to terrorism through
its funding projects." 2 The Board further agreed that the asylum seeker's denial of such
links was not credible in light of the scope of such funding efforts, and the public record
linking GFR's financial activities to known terrorist organizations. The significant evidence
shifted the burden of proof to the respondent who was unable to meet it. Respondent
claimed on appeal that he had been prejudiced by the fact that federal employees were
allowed to attend the hearing, in arguable contravention of a protective order which the
immigration judge had issued with regard to a central document in the case, the Declaration
of an FBI agent setting forth the investigation of GRF. The Board dismissed this argument,
holding that the protective order was based on national security concerns and was not for
the benefit of the asylum seeker. In fact, the Board ruled that the asylum seeker, through
his attorney, had violated the protective order through communication of the government
Declaration to a third party, and hence was ineligible for any relief except bond.'" The
case remains noteworthy because it: (1) demonstrates application of the national security
grounds of ineligibility for asylum; (2) illustrates how the burden shifting rules will be
applied where grounds of ineligibility are at issue; and (3) demonstrates the collateral con-
sequences of violating an immigration judge's protective order.
A recent decision by the Attorney General reveals that the DHS's detention policy rela-
tive to asylum seekers is expanding. In Matter of D-Jn-, 114 the Attorney General overturned,
as unwarranted, the bonded release of a Haitian asylum seeker who had attempted to reach
U.S. shores by boat and who had been apprehended onshore. The opinion noted that there
is no constitutional right to an individualized bond hearing for inadmissible non-citizens."'
The Attorney General went on to rule that the public policy considerations raised by the
INS on appeal merited overturning the asylum seeker's release on bond. Primarily, the
Attorney General argued that attempted entry without admission would encourage other
non-citizens to attempt the same type of unlawful landing thereby promoting a mass in-
flux.)16 He also found that granting release on bond would promote evasion of an orderly
inspection and admissions process. The opinion noted that third country nationals used
Haiti as a point of transit to the United States." 7 The national security implications of these
130. Id.
131. In re R-S-H, 23 1. & N. Dec. 629 (B.I.A. 2003).
132. Id.
133. Id.
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findings were deemed persuasive, despite the fact that they had no relevance to the indi-
vidual merits of the case at hand. In another aspect of its ruling, the Board found that the
1967 Protocol whereby the United States became bound by the 1951 Convention on the
Status of Refugees was not self-executing, and therefore did not give rise to any independent
rights in U.S. courts or administrative tribunals.
In Matter of Garcia-Hernandez38 the Board ruled that a non-citizen seeking Cancel-
lation of Removal, Part B, was not eligible for that relief where he had been convicted
of two crimes: (1) causing corporal injury to a spouse, which was a CIMT but was subject
to the "petty offense" exception; and (2) battery, which was not a CIMT.39 Under the
"petty offense" exception contained in INA § 212(a)(2), a non-citizen shall not be deemed
to have been convicted of a CIMT if: (1) the maximum penalty for the offense does not
exceed one year's imprisonment; and (2) the sentence actually imposed is less than six
months, provided that the alien has been convicted of "only one crime."'' 40 The Board,
looking to the legislative history of the "petty offense" provision, held that the "only one
crime" proviso means essentially one crime involving moral turpitude. 41 The Board's
ruling puts to rest a highly unsettled question in the law which had been plaguing prac-
titioners, and adopts a construction of the INA that most scholarly authority had rec-
ommended as appropriate.
In Matter of Koloamatangi,141 the Board ruled that an alien who had obtained his per-
manent residence by fraud was not eligible to apply for Cancellation of Removal, Part A,
a form of relief available only to lawful permanent residents who have maintained seven
years domicile in the United States, at least five of which as a permanent resident. Looking
at the statutory language in INA § 240A(a), the Board determined that the applicant had
never in fact been a lawful permanent resident of the United States because he had never
been lawfully admitted.' 4 3
Finally, in Matter of Assaad,144 the Board re-affirmed its earlier ruling in Matter ofLazada'41
that a motion to reopen could be predicated on ineffective assistance of counsel in the
expulsion proceedings. In the Assaad case, ineffective assistance resulted in a failure to file
a timely appeal, which had not been discovered by the respondent until three years after
the proceedings culminated in a final administrative order. The Board, over the objection
of DHS, held that Lazada applied in this set of circumstances, noting that "a respondent
has a Fifth Amendment due process right to a fair immigration hearing and may be denied
that right if counsel prevents respondent from meaningfully presenting his or her case."'-
V. Asylee and Refugee Admissions; Temporary Protected Status
At the time of this writing, refugee resettlement for fiscal year 2003 was still subject to
extraordinary delays caused by background and security checks. After the September 11,
138. In re Fidel Grcia-Hemandez, 23 1. & N. Dec. 590 (B.IA. 2003).
139. Id.
140. INA § 212(a)(2).
141. 23 1. & N. Dec. 590.
142. In re Siaosi Fisiimaile Koloamatangi, 23 1. & N. Dec. 548 (B.I.A. 2003).
143. Id.
144. In re Assaad, 23 1. & N. Dec. 553 (B.I.A. 2003).
145. In re Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. 637 (B.I.A.1988).
146. 23 1. & N. Dec. 553.
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2001 terrorist attacks, the admission of overseas refugees was sharply reduced. Only 27,000
of the 70,000 authorized for fiscal year 2002 were actually admitted.147 The President re-
jected the pleas of refugee advocates to compensate for this shortfall by increasing the
authorized number of admissions in 2003. Instead, the President lowered the number of
authorized refugee admissions to 50,000-not including an unallocated reserve of 20,000
for which there is no funding). At the close of fiscal year 2003, the Department of State's
Bureau for Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM) had admitted only 28,455 refugees,
about 21,545 short of the already reduced number of authorized admissions.141
At the same time, extraordinary delays continued with respect to asylees seeking to adjust
status to that of lawful permanent residence under INA § 209(a). Unlike refugees, asylees
seeking adjustment of status under INA § 209(b) are subject, to a 10,000 annual cap. Back-
logs spurred a class action lawsuit in 2003 alleging that, since 1994, the AG had failed to
distribute about 18,417 asylum visa numbers that should have been made available. 49 The
lawsuit remained pending at year's end.
On a positive note, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees issued an
opinion letter in the early part of the year stating that becoming a lawful permanent
resident does not terminate refugee status.5 0 The opinion letter may be very important
for refugees placed in removal proceedings, implying that many who have been admitted
as refugees are not "properly subject to deportation."'' Similarly, on March 10, 2003,
William Yates, Acting Associate Director of Operations for CIS, issued a memorandum
of law to the effect that those non-citizens who have been granted asylum are authorized
to work incident to status and are not required to apply independently for employment
authorization."' The policy brings asylees into line with the regime governing refugees
who also may work incident to status without being granted employment authorization
by DHS.
The year also saw a great deal of activity in the area of Temporary Protected Status
(TPS). On January 27, 2003, the Department of Justice determined that TPS status for
Angola, originally designated in March 2000, would not be renewed and would be termi-
nated on March 29, 2003.'11 The AG granted a final extension of TPS for Sierra Leone in
light of substantially changed country conditions. TPS will terminate six months after ex-
piration of the current extension on March 4, 2003.14 Extensions of TPS were granted for
the following countries: (1) Montserrat, until August 27, 2004; 11 (2) Honduras and
147. STEVEN LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY 144 (3d ed. Supp., Foundation Press
2003).
148. Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration, U.S. Dept. of State, U.S. Refugee Admissions Program
News, Vol. 1, Issue 2, available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/26158.pdf.
149. Ngwanyia v. Ashcroft, 302 F. Supp. 2d 1076 (D. Minn. 2004).
150. Letter from Attorney Robert Pauw to Interpreter Releases, quoted in 80 Interpreter Releases 413 (Mar.
17, 2003).
151. See id.
152. See generally William Yates, Asylees, Rejugees Authorized to Work in the U.S. Regardless ofEAD, BCIS Says,
80 Interpreter Releases 511 (Apr. 7, 2003).
153. Termination of Designation of Angola Under the Temporary Protected Status Program, 68 Fed. Reg.
3896 (Jan. 27, 2003).
154. Termination of Designation of Sierra Leone Under the Temporary Protected Status Program, 68 Fed.
Reg. 52407 (Sept. 3, 2003).
155. Extension of the Designation of Montserrat Under the Temporary Protected Status Program, 68 Fed.
Reg. 39106 (July 1, 2003).
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Nicaragua, jointly untilJanuary 5, 2005;116 (3) Liberia, until October 1, 2004;' 7 (4) Somalia,
until September 17, 2004;1"s and (5) El Salvador, until March 9, 2004.'19
VI. Conclusion
The year, at best, could be characterized as ambiguous with respect to the future of
immigration law and policy. While the social advances contemplated by DREAM seemed
within grasp, the field was filled with restrictive proposals reminiscent of the USA
PATRIOT Act. The legislative atmosphere continued to be redolent with secret proceed-
ings, mass detentions, and the discriminatory social policies spawned by the September 11
attacks. Resistance to these policies, however, continued at the federal and local levels. At
the same time, the Supreme Court's decision in Demore v. Kiam, which although clearly
limited to its facts, challenges Zadvydas v. Davis and seems to spell a period of equipoise
with regard to judicial control of the plenary power.
Meanwhile, the Board and the courts continued to wrestle with the kinds of cases that
have always played such an important role in immigration jurisprudence. There were some
important developments, including the Board decision holding that past forced sterilization
does not preclude the asylum seeker from the presumption of future persecution. 160 The
large picture, however, remains very much in doubt, at least in the near term. Greater
insistence on human rights in the field of immigration is most definitely making itself felt,
as witnessed by local opposition to erratic administration of the USA PATRIOT Act. The
Second and Ninth Circuits' exercise of judicial control over the government's policy of
subjecting "enemy combatants," to detention without trial provided much needed legal
clarity to an otherwise highly pejorative situation. The Supreme Court's grant of certiorari
to hear whether habeas corpus could be successfully invoked by those detained at Guan-
tanamo was also a significant legal development. The degree to which human and civil
rights concerns will affect immigration law and policy unquestionably rests largely in the
Court's hands.
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